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The “apostles of terror”: South Africa, the East African campaign,  
and the Battle of El Wak 
 
Evert Kleynhans 
 
Abstract 
 
Shortly after the outbreak of the Second World War, the Union Defence Force (UDF) 
had to undergo a rapid transformation from an ageing defence force to one that could 
project offensive power across Africa. The formation of the 1st South African Division 
(1st SA Div) during 1940, and the subsequent deployment of South African troops to 
the East African theatre, afforded the UDF the opportunity to test its military 
capabilities under operational conditions against the Italian threat in Ethiopia (then 
Abyssinia) and Somalia (then Italian Somaliland). It had been 21 years since the 
Union of South Africa was last in a state of war, and the UDF’s first battle in East 
Africa is a prime tool by which to measure concepts such as force design, military 
innovation and the operational employment of forces, to name but a few. The Battle of 
El Wak was not only the UDF’s initial battle in the East African campaign, but also 
South Africa’s first battle during the Second World War. By drawing from primary 
archival material and secondary sources, the article concludes that the Battle of El 
Wak had a definite impact on the entire South African campaign in East Africa. 
  
Keywords: Second World War; East Africa; Union Defence Force; 1st South African 
Division; George Brink; El Wak. 
 
Opsomming 
 
Kort na die aanvang van die Tweede Wêreldoorlog moes die Unieverdedigingsmag 
(UVM) vinnig transformeer vanaf ŉ verouderde verdedigingsmag, na een wat offensiewe 
mag kon projekteer regoor Afrika. Die totstandkoming van die 1ste Suid-Afrikaanse 
Divisie (1ste SA Div) gedurende 1940, en die daarop volgende ontplooiing van Suid-
Afrikaanse troepe na die front in Oos-Afrika, het aan die UVM die geleentheid gebied om 
sy militêre bekwaamheid onder operasionele omstandighede te toets teen die Italiaanse 
bedreiging in Ethiopië (toe Abessinië) en Somalië (toe Italiaanse Somaliland). Dit was 
reeds 21 jaar sedert die Unie van Suid-Afrika in ŉ toestand van oorlog verkeer het, en 
dus is die UVM se eerste veldslag in Oos-Afrika ŉ nuttige instrument om konsepte soos 
magstruktuur, militêre innovering en die operasionele ontplooiing van gevegsmagte mee 
te bestudeer. Die slag van El Wak was nie net die UVM se eerste veldslag in die Oos-Afrika 
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veldtog nie, maar ook Suid-Afrika se eerste veldslag gedurende die WW2. Deur gebruik te 
maak van primêre argivale bronne, en aangevul deur sekondêre bronne, bevind die 
artikel dat die slag van El Wak ŉ beduidende impak op die algehele Suid-Afrikaanse 
veldtog in Oos-Afrika gehad het. 
 
Sleutelwoorde: Tweede Wêreldoorlog; Oos-Afrika; Unieverdedigingsmag; 1ste Suid-
Afrikaanse Divisie; George Brink; El Wak. 
 
Introduction 
 
The deployment of the 1st SA Div to East Africa during the Second World War has been 
the subject of a number of academic and popular historical publications. Some of the 
more general works that cover the South African deployment to East Africa provide a 
rare, in-depth narrative on the campaign. The first of these appeared as early as 1941, 
and many were overtly propagandistic, published specifically to bolster wartime morale. 
These works include Springbok Victory;1 Vanguard of Victory: A Short Review of the South 
African Victories in East Africa 1940–1941;2 It’s a Long Way to Addis;3 South Africa Fights;4 
and Pienaar of Alamein: The Life Story of a Great South African Soldier.5 These 
publications naturally add to the discussion on the South African offensive operations in 
East Africa. In 1960, Avenge Tobruk was published.6 The author, Eric Hartshorn, the 
officer commanding of the Transvaal Scottish during the campaign, offers a unique, but at 
times rather colourful, and highly doubtful perspective on the South African deployment. 
The focus of the work is, however, only on the First South African Brigade (1st SA Bde) 
and its operational employment throughout the campaign as part of the 11th and 12th 
African Divisions. The next book on this war appeared in 1965 and was Harry Klein’s 
Springboks in Armour: The South African Armoured Cars in World War II,7 which 
addresses the South African deployment of armour during the campaign. Klein, however, 
gives scant attention to historical objectivity in his analysis of the successes and failures 
of the South African armour operations. 
 
An official history of the South African deployment to East Africa during the 
Second World War, although planned, has never materialised.8 Sadly, the Union War 
Histories Section, tasked with undertaking the project, was closed down permanently 
                                                          
1. C. Birkby, Springbok Victory (Libertas, Cape Town, 1941). 
2. C. Norton and U. Krige, Vanguard of Victory: A Short Review of the South African 
Victories in East Africa 1940–1941 (Government Printer, Pretoria, 1941). 
3.  C. Birkby, It’s a Long Way to Addis (F. Muller, London, 1943). 
4. J.S.M. Simpson, South Africa Fights (Hodder & Stoughton, London, 1941). 
5. A.M. Pollock, Pienaar of Alamein: The Life Story of a Great South African Soldier (Cape 
Times Ltd, Cape Town, 1943). 
6. E.P. Hartshorn, Avenge Tobruk (Purnell, Cape Town, 1960). 
7. H. Klein, Springboks in Armour: The South African Armoured Cars in World War II 
(Purnell, Johannesburg, 1965). 
8. I.J. van der Waag, “Contested Histories: Official History and the South African Military 
in the Twentieth Century”, in J.G. Grey (ed.), The Last Word? Essays on Official History 
in the United States and British Commonwealth (Praeger, Westport, 2003), pp 36–41. 
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in 1961 after the appearance of only three publications.9 One agrees with military 
historian David Katz, who suggests that the nadir of this important task was ushered 
in when the Afrikaner-oriented National Party assumed power in 1948.10 From 1961 
recording of South Africa’s WWII effort remained somewhat haphazard, with the 
government, the citizen force and the ex-servicemen’s associations all at some stage 
undertaking projects aimed at resuscitating the memories of South Africa’s 
participation in the war. This led to the publication of a number of historiographical 
works, some of which were of dubious quality and hagiographic in outlook. 
 
An advisory committee was set up to ensure that the programme for 
publications on military history would continue to function, but the semi-official 
histories emanating from this endeavour clearly lack original research and they rely 
far too heavily on the unpublished manuscripts compiled by the Union War Histories 
Section. As such, they add little to the general body of knowledge on South African 
participation in the war.11 The first volume of the “South African Forces in World War 
II” series appeared in 1968, under the title of East African and Abyssinian 
Campaigns.12 Though essentially a campaign history, Neil Orpen’s work, rather 
alarmingly, is the most complete publication to have appeared on the South African 
operations in East Africa. Unfortunately, the book fails to place the South African 
operations during the campaign into strategic context, especially against the 
backdrop of the larger Allied offensive operations in the theatre. It remains a rather 
warped and one-sided version of the campaign. 
 
In 1979, Neil Orpen and Henry Martin published South Africa at War13 as a 
part of the same series. This book explains some aspects of the South African home 
front during the war, including the logistical, administrative and industrial efforts 
undertaken by the Union government to supply the Allied Forces in East Africa with 
much-needed war materiel. By 1981 Orpen and Martin produced the first volume of 
Salute the Sappers,14 which covers the South African Engineer Corps (SAEC) 
                                                          
9. J.G. Grey, ‘“Standing humbly in the ante-chambers of Clio’: The Rise and Fall of Union 
War Histories”, Scientia Militaria 30, 2 (2000), pp 260–264. The three publications 
are: J. Agar-Hamilton and L.C.F. Turner, Crisis in the Desert, May–June 1942 (Oxford 
University Press, Cape Town, 1952); J. Agar-Hamilton and L.C.F. Turner, The Sidi 
Rezegh Battles, 1941 (Oxford University Press, Cape Town, 1957); L.C.F. Turner, H. 
Gordon-Cumming and J. Betzler, War in the Southern Oceans, 1939–1945 (Oxford 
University Press, Cape Town, 1961). 
10.  D.B. Katz, “A Case of Arrested Development: The Historiography Relating to South 
Africa’s Participation in the Second World War”, Scientia Militaria, 40, 3 (2012), pp 
282–284. 
11.  Katz, “A Case of Arrested Development”, pp 284–295, p 308. 
12.  N. Orpen, South African Forces World War 2, Volume 1: East Africa and Abyssinian 
Campaigns (Purnell, Cape Town, 1968). 
13.  H.J. Martin and N. Orpen, South African Forces World War 2, Volume 7: South Africa at 
War: Military and Industrial Organization and Operations in Connection with the 
Conduct of the War, 1939–1945 (Purnell, Cape Town, 1979). 
14.  N. Orpen and H.J. Martin, South African Forces World War 2, Volume 8: Salute the 
Sappers, Part 1 (Sappers Association, Johannesburg, 1981). 
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deployments to the East and North African theatres during the war and provides 
important insight on the influence of geography on the offensive operations in East 
Africa during the campaign and the strenuous efforts of the South African engineers 
to provision the Allied forces with sufficient water. 
 
 In 1987 Carel Birkby produced a biography on the erstwhile General Officer 
Commanding of the 1st SA Div – George Brink, titled Uncle George: The Boer Boyhood, 
Letters and Battles of Lieutenant-General George Edwin Brink,15 which allowed for an 
interesting view on the strategic, operational and political decisions behind the South 
African campaign in East Africa. This work also adds valuable insights on the 
employment of South African troops and the battle handling of the South African 
division during the campaign. In 1990, James Ambrose Brown produced The War of a 
Hundred Days: Springboks in Somalia and Abyssinia 1940–1941,16 as part of Ashanti 
Publishing’s “South Africa at War” series. However, Brown fails to add new 
information and perspectives on the subject, and unsurprisingly this publication does 
not account for a number of operations in which South African troops were involved 
after the liberation of Addis Ababa in April 1941.17 
 
Several contemporary academic publications supplement the available 
popular works on the South African campaign in East Africa. Gustav Bentz’s 2012 
article, “From El Wak to Sidi Rezegh: The Union Defence Force’s First Experience of 
Battle in East and North Africa, 1940–1941”,18 although restricted to a cursory 
analysis of the Battle of El Wak, provides a limited evaluation of its impact on the 
South African campaign. This article stems essentially from his 2013 MMil 
dissertation, titled Fighting Springboks: C Company, Royal Natal Carbineers: From 
Premier Mine to Po Valley, 1939–1945,19 in which he devotes an entire chapter to the 
South African deployment to East Africa. Despite being a seminal work, particularly 
since it provides an unprecedented insight into the personal experiences of South 
African troops during the war, his analysis of the East African campaign, as with 
Hartshorn’s, is limited to the offensive operations of the 1st SA Bde during the 
campaign. David Katz’s 2014 MMil dissertation, Sidi Rezegh and Tobruk: Two South 
African Military Disasters Revisited, 1941–1942,20 though not focusing exclusively on 
the East African campaign, provides some discussion on the deployment of the UDF to 
this theatre. Katz highlights the many shortcomings during offensive operations and 
discusses the implications that these shortcomings had on the subsequent 
                                                          
15.  C. Birkby, Uncle George: The Boer Boyhood, Letters and Battles of Lieutenant-General 
George Edwin Brink (Johannesburg, Jonathan Ball, 1987). 
16.  J. Ambrose Brown, The War of a Hundred Days: Springboks in Somalia and Abyssinia 
1940–41 (Johannesburg, Ashanti, 1990). 
17.  Katz, “A Case of Arrested Development”, pp 285, 302. 
18.  G. Bentz, “From El Wak to Sidi Rezegh: The Union Defence Force’s First Experience of 
Battle in East and North Africa, 1940–1941”, Scientia Militaria, 40, 3 (2012). 
19.  G. Bentz, “Fighting Springboks – C Company, Royal Natal Carbineers: From Premier 
Mine to Po Valley, 1939–1945”, MMil Thesis, Stellenbosch University, 2013. 
20.  D.B. Katz, “Sidi Rezegh and Tobruk: Two South African Military Disasters Revisited 
1941–1942”, MMil thesis, Stellenbosch University, 2014. 
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deployment of the South African forces to the Western Desert. The author’s own 2014 
MMil dissertation, Armoured Warfare: The South African Experience in East Africa 
1940–1941,21 focuses on the deployment of South African armour in East African 
campaign, and addresses an aspect of the South African offensive operations that had 
received little or no previous scholarly attention. 
 
 In 2015, Ian van der Waag’s A Modern Military History of South Africa22 
appeared, in which the author discusses the South African involvement in the Second 
World War at length in one of the chapters. Van der Waag’s carefully researched book 
places the South African participation in the Second World War into a strategic 
context and provides an unprecedented analysis of the social, economic and political 
factors that underpinned the military involvement of the UDF in the war. Van der 
Waag’s discussion of the East African campaign is, however, cursory at best, and he 
fails to discuss the strategic and operational consequences of the first South African 
operational deployment during the war. Andrew Stewart’s The First Victory: The 
Second World War and the East Africa Campaign23, which first appeared in 2016, 
provides a highly critical account of the entire campaign in East Africa, with a detailed 
discussion at the operational and strategic levels of war. Stewart, while 
acknowledging the significant role played by the UDF during the campaign, rather 
surprisingly only glances casually over the offensive operations fought by Brink and 
his Division in southern Abyssinia in a mere paragraph, while the offensive 
operations through Italian Somaliland and Eritrea received the bulk of attention in his 
book. However, despite this shortcoming, it is in all likelihood the most complete 
account of the East African campaign to date. The most recent work to appear on the 
South African deployment to East Africa is the author’s article “The South African 
Offensive Operations in Southern Abyssinia, 1940–1941”.24 This article refocuses 
specific attention on the offensive operations of the 1st SA Div in southern Abyssinia 
through 1940–1941, which some contemporary historians regard as having no 
overall bearing on the successful outcome of the Allied campaign in East Africa. 
 
 Despite the above analysis of publications on the East African campaign and 
particularly the South African offensive operations through southern Abyssinia and 
Italian Somaliland, several glaring hiatuses remain. The offensive employment of the 
1st SA Div in the East African theatre of operations, and more especially the 
pronounced impact of the Battle of El Wak on the overall Allied campaign, needs 
drastic reassessment. This article thus has two main aims. First, it provides a brief 
discussion on the Battle of El Wak, by placing this specific battle and its importance 
into the overall strategic and operational framework of the Allied campaign in East 
                                                          
21.  E.P. Kleynhans, “Armoured Warfare: The South African Experience in East Africa, 
1940–1941”, MMil Thesis, Stellenbosch University, 2014. 
22.  I.J. van der Waag, A Military History of Modern South Africa (Jonathan Ball, Cape Town, 
2015). 
23.  A. Stewart, The First Victory: The Second World War and the East Africa Campaign 
(London, Yale University Press, 2016). 
24.  E.P. Kleynhans, “The South African Offensive Operations in Southern Abyssinia, 1940–
1941”, International Journal of Military History and Historiography, 38, 1 (2018). 
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Africa. Second, by taking recourse to the theoretical notion of “first battles”, the article 
re-evaluates the impact of the Battle of El Wak on the overall South African campaign 
through a number of salient points. They are: the changing nature of the South 
African offensive operations; the character and effectiveness of the Italian military 
forces; and the adverse influence of climate and terrain on the South African 
deployment in the war theatre. In doing so, the article uncovers aspects of the South 
African campaign which have received little or no previous scholarly attention. 
 
 
Map 1: Principal locations and routes of the South African 
 advance in East Africa, 1940-194125 
 
 
                                                          
25.  Map drawn by the author. 
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The Battle of El Wak 
 
Throughout December 1940 the General Officer Commanding East Africa Force, Lt 
Gen Alan Cunningham, grew eager to launch an attack somewhere along the Kenya-
Italian Somaliland border. This was due to mounting pressure from the commander-
in-chief of the Middle East, Lt Gen Sir Archibald Wavell, as well as the respective 
prime ministers of Britain and South Africa – Winston Churchill and Jan Smuts. The 
planned attack was significant for three reasons.  
 
Firstly, an attack would reduce the vast area of no-mans-land between 
Cunningham’s forward positions in Kenya and that of the Italian vanguard in 
southern Abyssinia and Italian Somaliland. Secondly, such an attack would provide 
Allied engineers with the opportunity to improve vital communication links and 
water sources in the inhospitable Northern Frontier District (NFD) of Kenya to 
support the planned offensives. Lastly, Cunningham believed that he could gain 
psychological ascendancy over the Italian troops by attacking isolated outposts and 
through sustained offensive patrols.26 Cunningham maintained that the culmination 
of the Allied troop training in the NFD of Kenya should be an attack on an Italian-
defended locality. After the first location chosen for an attack had been found 
unoccupied by Italian troops, he decided that the defended Italian outpost at El Wak 
would suffice as an objective for Maj Gen Alfred Godwin-Austen’s 12th African 
Division. El Wak straddled the Kenya-Italian Somaliland border and was 
approximately 176km to the north-east of Wajir (see Map 1 above). The entire force 
earmarked for the offensive against El Wak carried out a full dress rehearsal of the 
attack before the launch of the operation. This gave the troops and their respective 
commanders valuable insight on their precise roles in the operation – with particular 
attention paid to navigation, as well as night marching and movement with vehicles.27 
 
Before the Allied advance on the Kenya-Italian Somaliland border commenced, 
aerial reconnaissance conducted by the South African Air Force (SAAF) provided 
Godwin-Austen with valuable intelligence on the Italian defensive dispositions as well 
as on the approaches to El Wak. Godwin-Austen believed that a double envelopment, 
demanding a high degree of unity of action between his attacking forces, was needed 
to rid the area of its defenders.28 According to intelligence reports, the Italian garrison 
at El Wak consisted of approximately one battalion of infantry, some Banda irregulars 
and approximately sixteen guns,29 and that they would possibly withdraw from the 
area at the first sign of an Allied advance. Godwin-Austen decided to use Brig Collen 
                                                          
26.  Kleynhans, “Armoured Warfare”, p 61. 
27.  Orpen, East Africa and Abyssinian Campaigns, p 71; Klein, Springboks in Armour, pp 
26–27; A.F. Hattersley, Carbineer: The History of the Royal Natal Carbineers 
(Aldershot, Gale & Polden, 1950), p 68. 
28.  Department of Defence Documentation Centre (hereafter DOD Archives), World War 
II War Diaries (hereafter WD), Box 299, File: East Africa Force, Report on Operations 
1 November to 5 April 1941. 
29.  Orpen, East Africa and Abyssinian Campaigns, p 71. 
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Richards’ 24th Gold Coast Bde, codenamed DICKFORCE, and Brig Dan Pienaar’s 1st SA 
Bde, known as PINFORCE, for the attack on El Wak (see Map 2 below).30 
  
 
Map 2: The proposed plan of attack on El Wak – December 194031 
  
The attack on El Wak was scheduled for 16 December 1940, and both PINFORCE and 
DICKFORCE planned to leave Wajir on 14 December to make for their respective 
staging areas in the proximity of the British landing ground. The separate staging 
areas had to be occupied before first light on 15 December, after which there was to 
be no movement during daylight. Once dusk settled in, DICKFORCE would move 
forward, seize the British landing ground and then advance on the boundary cut. It 
would then be split into two separate columns and secure the objectives at Italian El 
Wak (Area X), British El Wak (Area Z) and the strategic waterholes at El Ghala (Area 
                                                          
30.  DOD Archives, WD, Box 300, File: 12 AFR DIV, Report on Operations at El Wak, 30 
December 1940. 
31.  Orpen, East Africa and Abyssinian Campaigns, p 72. 
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Y).32 PINFORCE was to cut the road to Bardera and capture the village of El Buru 
Hachi (Area W) while concurrently threatening the Italian Brigade Headquarters 
(Area V) (see Map 2).33 
 
 The advance of DICKFORCE and PINFORCE on El Wak occurred without any 
real interruption, despite fears that Italian scouts had observed their advance.34 
During the night of 15 February DICKFORCE fended off an Italian attack as they 
advanced through the dense bush towards the border cut, while the South African 
light tanks trampled a road through the dense scrubland allowing the infantry to 
move forward in their wake.35 By daybreak Column A of DICKFORCE advanced to a 
position east of the border cut, and after a ten-minute artillery concentration by the 
South African Artillery (SAA), the attack on Italian El Wak commenced. The South 
African tanks led the advance on Italian El Wak, with the Gold Coast infantrymen 
following in their wake with fixed bayonets. The resistance from Italian El Wak was 
nominal and after clearing the area of resistance, the tanks advanced towards El Allu 
and successfully engaged a strong Italian defensive position.36  
 
 The Italian Air Force disrupted the advance of Column B of DICKFORCE 
slightly when it attacked the column’s troop carriers. The biggest obstacle in Column 
B, however, was the difference of opinion between the South Africans and their East 
African counterparts on the deployment of infantry and armour in a combined 
operation. The men of the East African Armoured Cars insisted that the South African 
infantrymen screen their advance, a rather foolhardy and antiquated tactical 
employment of armour. Consequently, the Cape Town Rifles, more commonly known 
as the “Dukes”, led the advance into British El Wak under cover of a South African 
artillery bombardment. The artillery barrage sent the Italian defenders into a state of 
disrepair, and British El Wak and El Ghala were soon clear of all Italian resistance.37 
 
 By daybreak, the lead elements of PINFORCE had secured the British landing 
ground. A rather brief but haphazard Italian artillery and aerial bombardment failed to 
incur any damage on PINFORCE as they neared the boundary.38 The Transvaal Scottish 
                                                          
32.  DOD Archives, WD, Box 217, File C-9 1DEOR, 1st Battalion Duke of Edinburgh’s Own 
Rifles, December 1940; WD, Box 216, File C1-12 1 SA LT Tank Coy, War Diary of No. 1 
Light Tank Company December 1940. 
33.  DOD Archives, WD, Box 221, File A1-11 1 TS, War Diary 1st Bn Transvaal Scottish 
February 1941; WD, Box 219, File B1-6 1RNC, War Diary 1st Royal Natal Carbineers, 
December 1940; Hattersley, Carbineer, p 69. 
34. DOD Archives, WD, Box 300, File EA 128 12, AFR DIV. Report on Operations at El Wak, 
30 December 1940. 
35.  DOD Archives, WD, Box 216, File C1-12 1, SA LT Tank Coy. War Diary of No. 1 Light 
Tank Company December 1940. 
36.  DOD Archives, WD, Box 216, File C1-12 1 SA LT, Tank Coy. War Diary of No. 1 Light 
Tank Company December 1940; WD, Box 300, File EA 128 12 AFR DIV, Report on 
Operations at El Wak, 30 December 1940. 
37.  Orpen, East Africa and Abyssinian Campaigns, p 77. 
38.  DOD Archives, WD, Box 215, File B1-8 3 ACC, War Diary No. 3 Armoured Car Company 
December 1940; Box 300, File EA: 128 12 AFR DIV, Report on Operations at El Wak, 
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crossed the boundary shortly after daybreak and immediately launched an attack on 
the Italian Brigade Headquarters astride the road to Bardera, which they soon overran. 
Following in their wake, the Royal Natal Carbineers started their advance on the Italian 
positions at Zariba which was found devoid of any visible Italian presence. The 
Carbineers in the meantime advanced to the outskirts of El Buro Hachi and soon 
became embroiled in a skirmish with its defenders.39 By midday, the Carbineers had 
begun to gain the upper hand in the fighting when the order to fix bayonets was given. 
Without hesitation, the men stormed El Buro Hachi chanting the units’ Zulu war cry, 
and shortly after noon the town was cleared and the remaining Italian defenders 
routed. After a failed Italian counterattack, PINFORCE inflicted further heavy losses on 
the remaining Italian forces in the area.40 In the meanwhile, the Transvaal Scottish 
were ordered to exploit the area towards El Buro Hachi and join up with the 
Carbineers. During this foray, they discovered the main Italian Headquarters in the El 
Wak area and captured valuable intelligence documents that highlighted the Italian 
defensive lines and troop dispositions across large tracts of the East African theatre. 
During the day’s offensive operations large stores of arms and ammunition were also 
captured.41 The men of DICKFORCE and PINFORCE accounted for their allotted 
objectives successfully before beginning the return journey to Wajir on 17 December.42 
 
 Cunningham’s advance on the Italian Somaliland border, and the subsequent 
Allied victory at El Wak, heralded the new impetus needed for the commencement of 
the offensive operations in East Africa. The Italians had been tried, tested, and found 
wanting at El Wak. Furthermore, the victory highlighted the inadequacies and lack of 
willpower of the Italian soldiers to make a concerted stand when attacked, while the 
South African soldiers proved they were a worthy fighting force during the assault. 
The support that the SAAF and SAA gave to both DICKFORCE and PINFORCE 
throughout the operation was remarkable, and this air-to-ground cooperation proved 
crucial to locating the Italian positions in the dense bush of East Africa. The attack on 
El Wak was the first time the UDF undertook a planned offensive action during the 
war, apart from brief skirmishes with local Banda groups during previous 
reconnaissance patrols in the NFD. In fact, El Wak was the first time that the South 
African troops were able to confirm the merits of combined arms warfare during an 
offensive operation.43 This method subsequently became the hallmark of the South 
                                                                                                                                                                                
30 December 1940; WD, Box 221, File A1-11 1 TS, War diary 1st Bn Transvaal 
Scottish December 1940; Orpen, East Africa and Abyssinian Campaigns, p 74. 
39.  DOD Archives, WD, Box 221, File A1-11 1 TS, War Diary 1st Bn Transvaal Scottish 
December 1940; WD, Box 219, File B1-6 1RNC, War Diary 1st Royal Natal Carbineers 
December 1940; WD, Box 215, File B1-8 3 ACC, War Diary No. 3 Armoured Car 
Company December 1940. 
40.  Hattersley, Carbineer, p 69. 
41.  Hartshorn, Avenge Tobruk, pp 47–49. 
42.  DOD Archives, WD, Box 287, File 1 SA Bde HQ Narrative 1941, El Wak Operation 31 
December 1940. 
43.  Combined arms warfare features coordination of infantry, artillery, armour, air 
support, intelligence, and other elements in military operations to ensure maximum 
operational or strategic effect. Warfare in 20th was marked by combined arms 
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African operations during the remainder of the campaign; thereafter it was only 
adversely affected by geographical and climatological factors. Furthermore, the South 
African troops were able to practise night movement and navigation during their 
advance on El Wak, a feat they were obliged to repeat time and again during the 
campaign in North African. The victory at El Wak was achieved at a relatively small 
cost with two South African soldiers killed and a handful of South African and East 
African troops injured. The Italian forces, however, had over 100 men killed, with a 
large variety of guns and war materiel captured by the Allied troops.44 
 
 
Figure 1: El Wak burning after the successful South African attack45 
  
The Allied victory at El Wak was significant for three reasons. First, the belief 
that Italian morale was far superior to that of the Allied forces, especially after the 
capture of British Somaliland and the reverses suffered at Moyale, Gallabat and 
Kassala during mid-1940, was immediately proven wrong. Indeed, the opposite was 
shown as most of the Italian defenders around El Wak had simply chosen to retreat 
rather than stomach a fight. Further, the victory at El Wak ensured that the Allied 
morale was on the ascent and this remained so for the rest of the campaign. Second, 
after the fall of El Wak, the Italian High Command decided to withdraw all Italian 
forces to their defensive line on the Juba River in Italian Somaliland. Only a handful of 
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Banda were left to the west of the river to act as harassing troops, while two well-
fortified Italian outposts remained at Afmadu and Kismayu. Finally, the victory at El 
Wak decided the pace and intensity of the remainder of the campaign in East Africa.46 
During December 1940 Cunningham decided to postpone his offensive operations 
from Kenya until May/June 1941. His decision, contrary to Wavell’s original plan, was 
based on several considerations, of which the scarcity of water supplies in the NFD47 
and insufficient motor transport to provision his forces along his lines of 
communications proved paramount.48 The Allied forces’ thrust towards Addis Ababa 
was, however, hastened by six months after the success at El Wak, mainly because 
Cunningham realised that it was possible to secure a firm foothold across the Juba 
River by the time the dreaded torrential rains arrived.49 
 
A critical analysis of the campaign 
 
The term “first battles”, as defined by Charles Heller and William Stofft in America’s 
First Battles, 1776–1965, refers to: 
 
… [the] first engagement in a war when the strengths and weaknesses of an 
army’s peacetime preparation, doctrinal development and force design, as well as 
the mobilization for the war itself, are tested by the exigencies of conflict and are 
found either to be good or in demand of urgent, wartime adjustment.50 
 
The Battle of El Wak is, in fact, a prime tool through which to measure the peacetime 
preparation of the UDF; its subsequent mobilisation for war; how it fought its first 
battle in East Africa; and of immense importance, how it adapted to the operational 
exigencies created during the ensuing campaign. While the peacetime preparation 
and the initial mobilisation of the UDF, at a cursory glance proved somewhat 
problematic, the article focuses instead on the impact of the Battle of El Wak as part 
of the broader South African operational deployment. Thus, by following the theory of 
“first battles” as outlined above, the impact of the Battle of El Wak on the unfolding 
South African campaign is evaluated through the changing nature of the South African 
operations, the character and effectiveness of the Italian military forces, and the 
adverse influence of climate and terrain on the UDF deployment in the theatre. 
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 The nature of the South African operations in East Africa varied considerably 
between that of the 1st SA Div, which operated in the southern Abyssinian province of 
Galla-Sidamo, and the 1st SA Bde which served with the 11th and 12th African Divisions 
through Italian Somaliland and into central Abyssinia. The 1st SA Div comprised of the 
Second South African Brigade (2nd SA Bde), commanded by Brig Ferdinand Buchanan, 
and the Fifth South African Brigade (5th SA Bde), commanded by Brig Frank Armstrong. 
The 1st SA Div had a very limited campaign in East Africa with its offensive operations in 
the Galla-Sidamo lasting only from mid-January 1941 to the capitulation and capture of 
the Italian fort at Mega on 18 February 1941. The 1st SA Div was initially tasked with 
securing the area around Dukana, Hobok and Gebel Affur, which culminated in a flanking 
attack on the Mega-Moyale escarpment. Brink was furthermore tasked to use flying 
columns, invariably consisting of armoured cars from the South African Tank Corps 
(SATC) units in his Division, to support the Shifta Rebellion forming in southern 
Abyssinia.51 Wavell instructed Cunningham to employ these South African troops on 
irregular lines,52 because this style of warfare, it was argued, suited the UDF psyche for 
mobile operations, largely considered to be South Africa’s national arm.53 
  
 Despite the Italian Somaliland operations receiving priority, Cunningham realised 
that Brink and his Division could play an active role in threatening Addis Ababa before 
the arrival of the rainy season.54 Brink’s offensive began officially on 15 January 1941, 
and he realised at once that water, and the access to it, would be the single most 
significant factor which would either confer success or defeat upon his Division during 
the coming offensive into Abyssinia. To sustain the physical and mechanical needs of his 
men and their Armoured Fighting Vehicles (AFV), and to deny the Italians the use 
thereof, Brink accepted that his Division would have to capture and control all the water 
sources along the Kenyan frontier. Brink argued that the occupation of these water 
sources would ease the advance of his forces into Abyssinia significantly by relieving 
pressure off his already stretched lines of communication.55 These movements were 
collectively known as the “cutting out” operations and would culminate in the 
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establishment of a series of administrative facilities and supply depots along this 
defensive line to secure sufficient stockpiles before the main Allied offensive began in 
January 1941.56 The first battle for Brink’s Division was fought between 16 and 17 
January 1941, when Buchanan’s 2nd SA Bde was ordered to occupy and hold the wells at 
El Yibo and El Sardu.57 The Battle of El Yibo, unlike the attack by Pienaar’s Brigade on El 
Wak, was but a staccato affair.58 The plan was to envelop the Italian forces occupying the 
area around El Yibo by armour and infantry acting in a mutually supportive role, similar 
to the operation carried out at El Wak. 
 
 
Figure 2: Typical terrain encountered by the South African soldiers  
during operations in the Northern Frontier District59 
 
 The three biggest obstacles facing the South African fighting patrol were the 
extreme heat, the lack of adequate maps and a severe shortage of water. Interestingly the 
biggest problem encountered during the Battle of El Yibo, however, was that of command 
and control which surfaced at the tactical level during the fight. Unity of action and 
command between the armoured cars and the infantry remained an issue throughout the 
operation to the extent where the fighting patrol’s effective deployment was essentially 
negated during the battle. It seems as if the infantry did not understand the doctrine that 
governed the employment of armour during operations. It was even felt that infantry 
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officers should not issue orders directly to individual armoured cars. This was 
unfortunately not an isolated case, with similar problems coming to the fore on several 
other occasions during the campaign.60 The capture of El Yibo and El Sardu were 
completed within three days without meeting any real Italian resistance. The South 
African capture of the wells at El Yibo and El Sardu, as well as the actions fought in the 
vicinity of the Turbi Hills and Sololo, ensured that the frontier regions of the Kenyan 
border were cleared of the Italian presence by the end of January 1941. These actions 
convinced Brink and his men that the nature and speed of their operations called for the 
accepted doctrine to be abandoned in lieu of tactical and operational requirements. This 
would become a hallmark of the South African offensive operations during the East 
African campaign.61 
 
 Late in the afternoon of 31 January, the lead elements of Brink’s 1st SA Div started 
to cross the Kenyan frontier into southern Abyssinia. During the ensuing offensive, the 
2nd and 5th SA Bdes, captured the Italian strongholds at Gorai (1 February), El Gumu (1 
February), Hobok (2 February), Banno (9 February) and Mega (18 February). Brink’s 
offensive in southern Abyssinia was marked by a high degree of mobility, as well as 
mutually supportive attacks by infantry, armour and the air force. It would seem that 
Brink’s men, by this time, understood the merits of the combined-arms approach during 
offensive operations. During the attacks on Gorai, El Gumu, Hobok and Banno, the South 
Africans met only token resistance from the Italian colonial and irregular defenders, 
while the armoured cars showed immense courage and dash during each attack.62 The 
strongest Italian bastion left in southern Abyssinia, the fort at Mega, was protected by 
experienced Blackshirt and Colonial Infantry battalions, reinforced by heavy artillery and 
a series of minefields. Brink was anxious when planning for the attack on Mega, because 
the assault on the fort would be the first instance during the entire campaign when South 
African fighting skills would be matched against a predominantly white Italian force. 
Brink’s plan for the assault on Mega was based on an envelopment, aimed at cutting the 
Italian line of retreat into the Abyssinia hinterland. The main attack on Mega was 
primarily an infantry affair, and the ensuing battle was fought in appalling weather. The 
successful occupation of the fort at Mega by the 1st SA Div ensured that Brink had cleared 
southern Abyssinia of all forms of Italian resistance.63 The 1st SA Div had accumulated a 
string of operational and tactical victories, including the capture of a vast number of 
Italian men and equipment. At the same time, its actions partly helped to foster a Shifta 
revolt in southern Abyssinia. The advantages of close cooperation between infantry, 
armour and the air force became paramount throughout Brink’s offensive in the south of 
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Abyssinia. By April 1941 the 1st SA Div was withdrawn from the theatre and redeployed 
to North Africa.64 
 
After the 1st SA Bde’s success at El Wak, the Italian forces fell back to the Juba 
River the only natural, defendable feature in Italian Somaliland and the site of the 
main Italian defensive line. Cunningham’s plan for the advance into Somaliland 
required swift, sharp action, essential in capturing adequate supplies and water at 
Afmadu, Jelib, Gobwen, Jumbo and the coastal port of Kismayu. The advance into 
Italian Somaliland began effectively on 12 February.65 Godwin-Austen informed 
Pienaar on the role envisaged for his 1st SA Bde during the coming offensive, stating:  
 
… the Infantry … alone, by vigorous assault by the bayonet, can win the day. They 
must not have any idea that a complete victory can be won by shattering the 
enemy by artillery and tanks … The tanks must not be left hanging about on the 
objective.66  
 
Pienaar, however, believed in the combined-arms approach. Its merits had been 
proved to him at El Wak. By mid-February, owing to a rapid advance and the fact that 
the Italians soldiers made no viable defensive stand, Afmadu, Gobwen and Kismayu 
were taken. Pienaar forded the Juba River at Yonte on 17 February, whereafter the 1st 
SA Bde captured Jumbo, Margherita and Jelib by the end of February 1941.  
 
Figure 3: South African engineers successfully fording the Juba River67 
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The British historian Andrew Stewart has described the fording of the Juba 
River as one of the most significant events, not only of the campaign, but of the entire 
war fought in Africa, because the successful crossing of the Juba River before the big 
rains meant that the hinterland of Italian Somaliland was now open for a rapid 
advance along the tarred Strada Imperiale highway.68 
 
The new route of advance negated the active employment of the South African 
armour because of sudden, drastic changes in the terrain. The dense bush and open 
desert flats which were characteristic of the Italian Somaliland coastal belt, and 
conducive to the effective employment of armour, gave way to the sweeping 
mountains which dominated southern and central Abyssinia. This meant that South 
African armoured cars were for the most part confined to roads and tracks and lost 
their freedom of movement.69 The Allied advance was extremely rapid and after the 
battlefield successes at the Marda Pass (21 March), Harar (25 March) and Diredawa 
(29 March), Addis Ababa was occupied on 6 April 1941.  
 
The fall of Addis Ababa did not see the end of hostilities in Abyssinia, however, 
because the Duke of Aosta and his Eritrean and Central Armies occupied a series of 
well-established mountain defences at Dessie and Amba Alagi where they intended to 
make a final stand. The South African forces were redeployed initially on counter-
insurgency operations to protect the local Italian population against the marauding 
Shifta bands around Addis Ababa, and thereafter fought in the battles at Combolcia 
(25 April) and Dessie (27 April). The penultimate battle for Amba Alagi was the final 
chapter in the complete collapse of Benito Mussolini’s East African Empire, save for 
the battles fought up until the surrender of Gen Nasi at Gondar in November 1941. 
Lasting for approximately fifteen days, the assault on Amba Alagi pitted South 
African, Indian and British attackers against their Italian counterparts in some of the 
harshest fighting conditions the East Africa Force experienced in the entire campaign. 
The Allied pincers on Amba Alagi closed in steadily from the north and the south, and 
by 16 May 1941, the Duke of Aosta was forced to sue for an armistice. The fall of 
Amba Alagi meant the end of the road for the men of the 1st SA Bde in East Africa. In a 
mere 53 days, Cunningham’s troops advanced more than 1 700 miles from the 
Kenyan frontier to Addis Ababa, occupying some 360 00 square miles and capturing 
more than 50 000 prisoners, all for the loss of 135 men killed, 310 wounded and 
another 59 missing. The South African losses alone were 73 men killed with an 
additional 197 battle-related casualties.70 
 
The character and effectiveness of the Italian armies in East Africa played a 
definite role in the ever-changing deployment of the South African forces as the Allied 
campaign unfolded throughout 1940–1941. The bold use of armour as part of the Allied 
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spearhead in East Africa was a direct consequence of the waning fighting ability of the 
Italian soldiers, as experienced by the South African forces during the initial offensive 
operations.71 There were, however, some salient points for the Allies to consider before 
the launching of an all-out offensive in East Africa. The Italian armies were known to be 
numerically superior, although the fighting quality of the Italian soldiers ranged from 
good to indifferent, and the Italian armoured units and artillery were seldom employed 
in large numbers.72 Initially, their fighting quality was adequately judged by the South 
Africans in the Battle of El Wak after the UDF’s “first battle” in East Africa. The poor 
fighting ability of the Italian colonial and irregular soldiers was realised immediately 
after this encounter, and the novel employment of the South African forces during the 
latter offensive operations bears testimony to this. As the campaign unfolded, it became 
evident that the Italian soldiers were demoralised and that they realised the futility of 
trying to defend their tactical positions against the might of a combined-arms attack.73 
Cunningham commented that the main difference between his troops and those facing 
them was that the British and Commonwealth troops were “mobile and dashing while 
[the Italians] were sluggish and unenterprising.”74 
 
 
Figure 4: South African armoured cars advancing into southern Abyssinia75 
                                                          
71.  DOD Archives, CGS, Group 2, Box 92, File 160/2, Military Intelligence Appreciations 
(General), Data on Italian Forces in I.E.A.; DOD Archives, CGS, Group 2, Box 92, File 
160/2, Military Intelligence Appreciations (General), Banda, 17 July 1940. 
72.  DOD Archives, Diverse, Group 1, Box 16, File 23, Security of East and Southern Africa, 
“An appreciation of the situation from the point of view of the Chief of the General 
Staff of information to the Minister of Defence, December 1939 to March 1940. 
73.  DOD Archives, Deputy Chief of Staff to Chief of the General Staff (DCS – CGS), Box 44, 
File UDF/132G, “Lessons Learnt in East African Campaign”, 6 January 1942. 
74.  Stewart, First Victory, p 143. 
75.  DOD Archives, Photographic Collection, 831001086. 
Kleynhans – Apostles of terror: South Africa, the East African campaign and the Battle of El Wak 
 
130 
 
 The lacklustre fighting character of the Italian soldier in East Africa ensured 
that when a South African armoured attack struck, the accompanying infantry was 
often left with mere mopping up operations to carry out on the objectives. The 
growing boldness of the South African employment of armour, however, annoyed 
Cunningham to such an extent that in a letter to Brink he stated that it should be used 
primarily as an infantry support weapon, and “that their firepower ... during this 
period was protective and not offensive”. In return, Brink scribbled a note on 
Cunningham’s letter: “... but my object in using the Armoured Cars boldly was to put 
the fear of God into the enemy’s native (sic) troops and in this we were most 
successful”.76 An Italian soldier also remarked that “you only have to make a noise 
like an armoured car and you will be in Mogadishu in a fortnight”.77  
 
The fact that most of the Banda fled at the first sight of the armoured cars, or 
after a brief skirmish, was ample evidence of the effect Brink sought. Hence the fact 
that Hartshorn refers to the South Africans as the “Apostles of Terror” in his 1952 
treatise Avenge Tobruk, where he gives a vivid description of the South African tactics 
as “… [to] turn the flank, crawl like snakes, and dash in like lions”.78 One can perhaps 
even argue that the South African armoured cars were used as a psychological 
weapon and that the fear they instilled in the Italian colonial and irregular levies were 
paramount to its operational successes.79 Brink employed his armour in exactly that 
fashion during the attacks on El Yibo, El Sardu, Gorai, El Gumu, Hobok and Banno, 
while Pienaar deployed his armour in a similar manner at El Wak, the battles around 
the Juba River and throughout the rest of the advance towards Addis Ababa.80 The 
waning fighting efficiency and determination of the Italian military forces in Italian 
Somaliland and Abyssinia directly influenced the bold, and at times foolhardy, tactical 
and operational deployment of South African forces. The British war correspondent, 
Alan Moorehead, when describing the nature of the Allied operations in East Africa, 
perhaps best describes the nature of the South African operations when he said:  
 
Most of the preconceived ideas of colonial warfare went west in Abyssinia … As 
the guns breasted each rise they blasted the enemy out of the valley below and 
charged after them. It was untechnical and unprecedented, and it knocked the 
Italians into bewildered surrender.81 
 
 There were, however, some occasions during the East African campaign where 
the Italian forces put up a stout defence. These include the battles of Uaddara, 
Combolcia, Dessie, and Amba Alagi, fought during the latter half of the Abyssinian 
campaign and after the fall of Addis Ababa. These actions occurred mainly in the 
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Abyssinian highlands, during adverse weather, and were principally infantry and 
artillery affairs.82 Although Italian armoured units were deployed in relatively small 
numbers during the campaign, they remained an ever-present threat. The most 
prominent of these was the arrival of Italian tanks at El Sod and at the Dadaba River 
where the South Africans were ordered to withdraw amid great confusion.83 While 
serving as an effective weapon when attacking infantry, the South African armoured 
units avoided an armoured engagement with their Italian counterparts throughout 
the campaign, probably in recognition of the fact that the Italian armour’s armament 
was superior to their own. In fact, each time the Italian armoured cars and tanks 
appeared on the battlefield, the South African armour was forced to withdraw or 
suffered some losses.  
 
In hindsight, the provision of an anti-tank gun on the South African armoured 
cars might have enabled them to engage Italian armour in East Africa successfully. 
The South Africans enjoyed relative success when encountering Banda, but on the 
other hand, the Italian Colonial Infantry and Blackshirts provided fierce resistance on 
a number of occasions by using the natural surroundings to their advantage.84 The 
untimely destruction of the Italian Air Force also left the Italians with inadequate air 
support throughout the campaign, which meant that the South African forces often 
deployed in a rather brash fashion, with no real movement control for want of enemy 
aerial interdiction. This was in stark contrast to the accepted UDF standing orders 
and doctrine and cost the South Africans dearly in North Africa where the German Air 
Force provided an ever-present danger.85 
 
The geography of East Africa conferred both a strategic and tactical advantage 
in defence on the Italians – although they never really used it to their advantage. The 
unforgiving East African terrain covered an area of some 540 000 square miles which 
extended from the flat, featureless and almost waterless bush of the NFD in Kenya, to 
the coastal plains of Italian Somaliland and the rolling bush country and mountains of 
Abyssinia.86 The Abyssinian plateau, covering more than half of Italian East Africa, 
provided an excellent defensive position, especially against attacks from the Sudan or 
Kenya. The Kenyan Highlands, in turn, offered the Allied forces a strong defensive 
position from which they could protect their lines of communications stretching into 
the NFD.87 The NFD was a low-lying, waterless, semi-desert which stretched for 250 
miles from the frontier and was a significant obstacle to any force trying to traverse it. 
Furthermore, in the rainy season, it became a quagmire which made any movement 
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difficult.88 The rough nature of the terrain hampered the employment of the UDF 
troops throughout the campaign and led to the novel employment of the South 
African forces in East Africa.89  
 
 
Figure 5: South African infantry traversing a stretch of waterless desert90 
 
During the opening salvos of the campaign, the terrain allowed for the varied 
employment of the South African armoured cars, tanks and motorised infantry owing 
to the ability of the fighting vehicles to deploy cross-country quickly. With few 
undulations in the terrain, the armour was predominantly used in wide flanking 
movements throughout the bush, often allowing the South African commanders to 
effect an envelopment and gain both a tactical and operational surprise. As the 
campaign progressed from the vast open spaces of Italian Somaliland and the NFD to 
the mountainous highlands of southern and central Abyssinia, the South African 
operational deployment underwent a drastic change. The use of armour became 
limited because of the extreme changes in terrain, and after the capture of the Marda 
Pass, the ever-present open flanks, so conducive to armoured warfare, completely 
disappeared. In fact, the mobile, rapid phase of the southern advance was replaced by 
a tedious infantry slog for the mountains. This drastic change in terrain meant that 
the South African commanders had to reassess their operational strategies and tactics 
from that of mobile warfare to largely static/mountain warfare. In fact, the exigencies 
of mountain warfare were an entirely new experience for the South African soldiers, 
who were far more adept at mobile warfare. As a result, South African operational 
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losses rose during this period of the campaign, with the infantry bearing the brunt of 
the fighting. The next time South African soldiers experienced similar terrain was 
during the campaign in Italy in 1944 with the 6th South African Armoured Division. 
Despite the defensive advantages offered by the East African terrain, the Italian 
defence of the theatre was all but negligible.91 
 
Figure 6: South African infantrymen during the battle for the mountains92 
 
In addition, the East African climate influenced the operational efficiency and 
employment of the South African forces. Due to the heavy rainfall and extreme 
temperatures in the NFD and the coastal areas, diseases were particularly 
prevalent.93 As such, it was an area of operations not suited to a lengthy military 
adventure.94 Malaria, especially prevalent in the NFD, necessitated the issue of 
adequate supplies of quinine. Dysentery, owing to the high levels of salts present in 
the soil and thus the water, also caused major health problems among the South 
African troops.95 The single biggest factor determining the pace of the Allied 
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operations in East Africa, as Cunningham acknowledged while planning his offensive 
operations, was the East African rainy season.96 
 
 
Figure 7: Extreme rainfall rendered large tracts of East Africa impassable97 
 
 There were two distinct rainy seasons in East Africa; a “small” one towards the 
latter half of the year, and a “big” one from April onwards. Despite this rainfall, and 
the presence of some large rivers, water remained a scarce commodity throughout 
the year.98 The access to and availability of water were thus specific determinants in 
the separate South African and Allied attacks.99 While the SAEC attempted to secure 
access to all the available water sources in the regions bordering the Italian East 
Africa Empire, especially in the NFD, armour was used concurrently as a means to 
secure distant wells and provide protection until occupation troops arrived. It was 
known that the advent of the torrential rains would turn the operational theatre into 
a muddy quagmire which would hamper military operations severely. Hence all 
offensives were launched before the beginning of the big rains, thanks to the timely 
victory in the Battle of El Wak. Predictably, when the heavy rains arrived in April 
1941, the South African forces’ mobility was curtailed severely and the offensive 
operations had to be halted for a few months. By then, however, most of the strategic 
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objectives had been achieved.100 Despite the adverse effect of several climatological 
factors on the East African theatre of operations, the South African forces continued 
their successful deployment throughout 1941. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The Allied offensives in East Africa began with the successful attack on El Wak during 
which some South African troops received their baptism of fire. The combat 
experience gained by the South African troops at El Wak proved paramount, as it was 
the first instance during the war in which the UDF was able to gauge its fighting 
efficiency and hence evaluate and adapt its doctrine and standing orders. 
Furthermore, the feeble Italian defence during the Battle of El Wak highlighted the 
ineffectiveness and inadequacies of Italian forces in East Africa. Though the Battle of 
El Wak was not crucial to the Allied victory in East Africa, it was the impetus required 
for the start of offensive operations in the East African theatre before the arrival of 
the rainy season. Between January and May 1941, the East Africa Force launched a 
series of successful attacks across Abyssinia and Italian Somaliland, culminating in 
the capture of Addis Ababa and the penultimate battle of Amba Alagi. At the time the 
campaign was described as a military record, with the offensive operations being 
carried out at a pace seldom surpassed in history. The South African troops played a 
vital role in securing the first campaign victory of the war, and often acted as the 
vanguard during offensive operations across the theatre. The South African successes 
in East Africa were, however, something of an anomaly; the lessons learnt from this 
campaign did not prepare the UDF sufficiently for its subsequent deployment to the 
North African theatre. These lessons would, in fact, have to be re-learnt in the 
Western Desert, where the nature of the enemy, its weapons and tactics could once 
more only be measured during the “first battle” in the desert. 
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